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Saufdans des circonstances extraordinairesprdvues par des dispositions particu-
lieres, le droit quebdcois des saretds mobilieres ne permet pas l'utilisation d'une
charge flottante semblable d celle de common law. Mais la reforme du Code civil
introduira dans le droit d'application gdneral un concept similaire. L'auteur
pretend qu'il existait au Qudbec, avant la codification, un 6quivalentfonctionnel de
la charge flottante de common law. La rdforme est donc un retour j la tradition
plus qu'une innovation. Si cette pritention est exacte, et qu'une telle charge
remonte au droit coutumierfranqais du seizieme siecle, alors se pose des questions
intrigantes sur l'origine de la charge anglaise. Et s'il est vrai que, jusqu'au milieu du
siecle dernier, le droit qudbdcois permettait l'hypotheque tant des meubles que des
immeubles, certaines des raisons "traditionnelles" d'une telle distinction sont
d'origine relativement rdcente.
Dans une premidre partie, l'auteur ddcrit la vision traditionnelle du develop-
pement du droit qudbecois des hypotheques mobilieres des aprs la codification de
1866. I1 dtudie ensuite des clause "tout bien" de certains actes quebdcois du ddbut
du dix-neuvieme siecle. Puis, comparant les saretds existant dans les coutumes de
Paris et de Normandie avec la charge flottante anglaise, l'auteur demontre que la
charge flottante moderne avait son iquivalent fonctionnel dans ces coutumes. I1
conclut en speculant sur les raisons qui ont pu amener la disparition de l'hypot-
heque mobilidre avant la codification.
1. Introduction
The impending modernization and rationalization of security
devices in Quebec's Civil Code heralds modifications similar to
those contained in Canadian Personal Property Security Act
Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. This paper was presented at the 18th
Annual Workshop on Commercial and Consumer Law, held at McGill University on
October 14-15, 1988. 1 benefitted from discussions at and following the session. I also
benefitted greatly from comments by David Vaver, Rod Macdonald and Jeremy Webber
on an earlier draft. I would like to acknowledge the research assistance of Gwen Shulman
and Gordon Pansegrau. All errors are mine. [The Annual Workshop is sponsored by the
Commercial and Consumer Law Section of the Canadian Association of Law Teachers
and by the Faculties of Law of the University of Toronto, McGill University, Queen's
University, and the Osgoode Hall Law School (Ed.)].
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("PPSA") regimes. Among the intended changes is the extension
of the concept of hypothecation, which presently covers
immoveable property only, to moveables, both corporeal and
incorporeal, and the introduction within the Code of the capacity
to charge present and future property.1 Under art. 2022 of the
present Civil Code, creditors are not able to take a hypothecary
interest (that is, a non-possessory security interest) in moveable
property, other than in exceptional circumstances permitted by
certain legislative enactments. With the same exception, it is not
possible to hypothecate future property.2 Among other changes,
the new reform will therefore introduce into the basic fabric of the
civil law a concept similar to the English floating charge.
There is a widely held belief that these proposed reforms are
innovations for the civil law. However, this paper will claim that
these reforms, far from being novel, actually revert to a pre-
codification civil law concept - the executory hypothec.
Although my research is still in progress, I can presently say with
some confidence that the executory hypothec on all property, both
present and future, was a well-established security device in
France and Quebec prior to the 19th century, and indeed dates at
latest from the 16th century. At a minimum, we can say that the
civil law in the pre-Napoleonic era contained a functional
equivalent to the floating charge. The corollary to this claim is
dealt with only peripherally in the following pages: contrary to the
received wisdom, the English floating charge was not a unique
development of the British judiciary in the late 19th century;
rather, it was borrowed, consciously or subconsciously, from the
civil law.
To date, I have been unable to uncover a judicial decision in the
period 1790-1866 that directly addresses the validity of these
Quebec charges, but circumstantial evidence strongly suggests
that they were valid. Such evidence includes the fact that the
charges appear in standard form contracts drafted by and used in
I Furthermore, the new hypothec will be a consensual lien, as is the security interest created
under modern PPSA regimes; see R.A. Macdonald, "The Reform of Secured Transac-
tions Law in Quebec: From Corrective Justice to Distributive Justice", paper presented to
the 18th Annual Workshop on Commercial Law, McGill University, Montreal, October
14, 1988.
2 This capacity is made available to Quebec creditors under the Special Corporate Powers
Act (An Act to Amend the Revised Statutes, 1909 by inserting therein articles 6119a,
6119b, 6119c and 6119d, S.Q. 1913-14, c. 51), and similar statutes; see infra, footnotes 9,
10. It is possible to create quasi-pledges pursuant to art. 1979a et seq.
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the offices of many of the notaries of the period, indicating
widespread, customary usage. Further, the notaries who drafted
these clauses were the senior notaries in the province, acting for
most of the wealthy strata of the society (e.g., Molson, Redpath,
McGill, Gerrard), and also for the major financial institutions
(e.g., the Bank of Montreal). A clause of this type was usually the
only charging clause in these deeds although negative pledge
covenants were sometimes included. Presumably, if the charge
was invalid, the notaries for the creditor would have insisted upon
a fixed charge on immoveables, in order to ensure that their client
obtained the status of secured creditor.
In addition, deeds containing these clauses came before the
judiciary on other matters throughout the early 19th century, yet
in no instance did advocates challenge the validity of the clauses in
an attempt to have the deed invalidated, nor did any member of
the Bench raise the issue. Understandably so: given the
widespread usage of the clause by the major creditors in the
province, invalidation would have instantly conferred unsecured
status upon most financiers. Circumstantial evidence suggests,
therefore, that the clauses were accepted as valid in early 19th
century Quebec.
The claim that the executory hypothec was a common security
device in French civil law, rather than a British innovation, raises
some intriguing questions concerning the disappearance of this
charge in Quebec law, and the traditional narrative of the devel-
opment of the floating charge in British common law doctrine. I
have no definitive answer to these questions.
I shall first outline the traditional understanding of the devel-
opment of Quebec law of hypothecation with respect to
moveables. I shall then, in the next section, describe certain
clauses in Quebec instruments from the early 19th century that
purport to charge all the debtor's property, moveable and
immoveable, present and future, and shall discuss the scope of
these charges. Although what legal effect these charges had is not
now known, there was an available precedent for them in the
Custom of Paris, the legal regime in force in Quebec during the
period in question. In the third section, in an attempt to ascertain
whether these clauses had the characteristics of a floating charge, I
will compare the common law floating charge and the functional
features of the executory hypothec contained in the Custom of
Paris and the Custom of Normandy. My conclusion is that these
1989]
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French charges were functionally similar to the English floating
charge.
Lastly I shall speculate about the disappearance of this charge
from Quebec law, placing the discussion in the economic context
of the day: what factors led to its disappearance - to the point
where it now seems to have passed from public consciousness - at
precisely the same time as the common law courts in Upper
Canada and England were striving to develop a similar concept?
Was this concept of an executory hypothec superseded by other
forms utilized by Quebec's legal community, or was it abandoned
for the sake of conceptual unity? I have no answers, although I
suspect that the cause of the disappearance can be attributed to
the restraints imposed upon the infant chartered banks by their
charters.
2. The Traditional Development of Doctrine
If we turn to the received wisdom regarding the development of
non-possessory security interests in moveables in Quebec, we first
observe that the narrative of this development is constructed
largely through the medium of doctrine - that is, case law and
statutes.
The traditional story is familiar enough. It begins with the
inability to hypothecate moveable property at the time of codifi-
cation in Quebec and moves from there to the gradual devel-
opment, through law reform, of legal institutions through which
non-possessory security interests in moveables could be acquired.
The social reality invoked to complement (or rationalize) the story
is that the doctrine developed, so it has been stated, in response to
the need to encourage, or facilitate, capital expansion. 3
Article 2022 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada ("C.C.L.C.")
reads in part: "Moveables are not susceptible of hypothecation".
In 1866, at the time of codification, the only means for asserting a
right of preference upon the proceeds of a judicial sale of
moveables known to Quebec law were the pledge,4 the privilege,5
the seller's right of revendication and resolution,6 title transactions
3 See, e.g., R. R. Pennington, "The Genesis of the Floating Charge" (1960), 23 Mod. L.
Rev. 630 at pp. 630-4. See also R.H. Anstie, "The Historical Development of Pledge
Lending in Canada-Part 1" (1967), 74 The Canadian Banker 81 at p. 82.
4 Articles 1966 et seq. C.C.L.C.
5 Articles 1994 etseq. C.C.L.C.
6 Articles 1998 to 2000 and article 1543 C.C.L.C.
[Vol. 15
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(e.g., the conditional sale), and the pledge of documents of title
(e.g., warehouse receipts and bills of lading). 7 Therefore, in 1866,
according to the conventional story, there was no non-possessory
security interest available to general creditors in Quebec, other
than these specified interests.
8
By the turn of this century, hypothecation of moveables was
allowed by special statutes, as an exception to the general rule of
art. 2022.9 These special statutes empowered certain corporate
entities with specific "public" purposes or goals, such as railway
and hydro projects, to give a non-possessory security interest in
moveables to the corporation's creditors. Such was the belief in
the unusual nature of the powers granted to these enterprises that
the facility was granted only after some contention; indeed, one
still finds recent comments to the effect that these special statutes
introduced certain "common law" concepts into the civil law. 10
Then, in 1914, the Special Corporate Powers Act" was intro-
7 See Macdonald, supra, footnote 1, at p. 34. See also Anstie, supra, footnote 3; and Alfred
Dubuc, "The Advent of Banking Credit on the Guarantee of Warehouse Receipts in
Canada" (1963), 70 The Canadian Banker 51.
8 The pledging of certain documents of title (namely, warehouse receipts) was, at its
inception in Quebec, a relatively clumsy concept, in that the owner of the goods could not
hold a receipt while retaining possession of the goods. Actual delivery to a warehouser
was essential. It therefore did not truly involve a concept of "non-possessory" security
interests. The earliest known usage of pledging warehouse receipts was 1848 (see Dubuc,
supra, footnote 7). Statutory recognition of this practice occurred in 1849 in An Act for
the Punishment of Warehousemen and others Giving false Receipts for Merchandize, and
of Persons receiving Advances upon Goods, and afterwards fraudulently disposing of the
same (S.L.C. 1849, c. 12,); and again in 1859, with An Act granting additional facilities in
commercial transactions (S.L.C. 1858, c. 20). These Acts were amended in 1861 to allow
for the issuing of "fictitious" warehouse receipts, issued by the owner of the goods, who
then retained possession (An Act to amend chapter fifty-four of the Consolidated Statutes
of Canada, entitled: An Act respecting Incorporated Banks, S.L.C. 1861, c. 23), and
ultimately incorporated in the current Bank Act, S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 40, Part I, s. 2, as
amended (now R.S.C. 1985, c. B-i), s. 179. These Acts are discussed in greater detail in
Anstie, supra, footnote 3.
Early usage of bills of lading for the same purposes is more difficult to trace, but
fictitious bills of lading were addressed in the same statutes as warehouse receipts
(fictitious bills of lading are also recognized in the Bank Act, s. 179). Placing warehouse
receipts and bills of lading to one side, the only known form of non-possessory hypothe-
cation of moveables at the time of codification in Quebec was the contract of respondentia.
However, warehouse receipts, bills of lading and respondentia, even if allowing for non-
possessory security interests in moveables, do not allow for the hypothecation of future
moveable property.
9 The general rule is outlined in F.W. Wegenast, The Law of Canadian Companies
(Toronto, Burroughs and Co., 1931), pp. 656 et seq.
10 See, e.g., S. La Bel, "Les dmissions d'obligations dans le droit de la province de Quebdc
de 1890 J nos jours" (1980), 21 Les cahiers de droit 43.
11 Supra, footnote 2.
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duced. Later, the agricultural pledge in 1940,12 and the
commercial pledge in 1962,13 modified the ability of private
persons to hypothecate moveables.
Thus, the traditional image of hypothecation of moveable
property in Quebec is that apart from fictitious documents of title,
respondentia, and certain well-defined privileges, it was not
possible in 1866 to hold a non-possessory security interest in
present moveables. In addition, although the position with regard
to the capacity to hypothecate future property may not have been
crystal clear in 1866, this possibility was definitely precluded by
1901.14 Throughout the last part of the 19th century, this
incapacity was altered by legislative enactment to meet the needs
of capital development.
3. Commercial Practice of the Early 19th Century
When, however, one turns to empirical evidence of commercial
practice in early 19th century Quebec, one finds a noticeable
discrepancy between that evidence and the doctrinal narrative.
One finds the presence of clauses in pre-codification deeds which
in effect granted to the creditor an executory hypothec over all the
debtor's assets, moveable and immoveable, "now-owned and
after-acquired".
Prior to codification, there were literally thousands of deeds
executed between debtors and creditors in which the creditor took
this right of preference on the debtor's assets. The typical phrase
that one finds inserted in the Quebec deeds reads as follows: 1
5
12 Loi du nantissement agricole, S.Q. 1940, c. 69.
13 Loi relativeau nantissement, S.Q. 1962, c. 57.
14 Corporation du Village de la Pointe Gatineau v. Hanson (1901), 10 B.R. 346. Compare
Holroyd v. Marshall, infra, footnote 26.
15 Archives national du Quebec d Montrdal (ANQM) CN 601-187 #3908 - contract of loan
(£6,000) made by Samuel Gerrard (merchant, creditor) to Thomas Torrance (merchant,
debtor), executed before Henry Griffin, notary, September 25, 1821. A typical clause in
the French language, in deeds concerning seigniorial lots, reads as follows:
... au payement de laquelle dite somme, outre le Privilege primitif acquis sur ladite
Terre, ledit Preneur a affecti, oblige & hipotheque ged6ralement tous ses biens,
meubles & immeubles, presens & d venir, une Obligation ne derogeant d l'autre; & si
ledit Preneur sesdits Hoirs & ayans cause avoient manque , satisfaire au contenu ci-
dessus, en ce cas pourra mon dit Sieur Seigneur Baillieur, rentrer de plein droit en
ladite Terre, sans pour se garder ni observer aucune forme ni figure de procds: ces
Presentes neanmoins demeurant en leur force & vertu, pour les arrerages desdits Cens
& Rentes lors dds & 6chus, & dommagesfaits sur ladite Terre.
See ANQM CN 601-269 #3 Concession par Monsieur Le General Christie ... d Amant
[Vol. 15
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... and, for the more ample security whereof, both principal and interest, he
the said [debtor] doth hereby specially bind, obligate, mortgage and hypoth-
ecate all and singular his real and personal property, present and future
(meubles et immeubles presens et avenir). One obligation not derogating
from the other: for thus, etc., ...
I first came across this language in my research on Quebec's
seigniorial system. These clauses were commonly inserted in
deeds of sale of censitaire's lots when the sale was vendor-
financed. The deeds within which I first found these phrases were
drafted between 1790 and 1796. Moreover, they were standard
form contracts - printed, rather than handwritten, with blank
spaces for the names of the parties, description of the lots, price,
etc., and executed before notaries. The fact that the deeds were in
printed form immediately suggests that they were customary
rather than unique.
Two features of the charge reproduced above attract attention.
First, it purports to cover moveable property - this is in direct
contrast to the principle later set out in art. 2022 of Quebec's Civil
Code. 16 Secondly, it purports to cover future assets. This may be
starkly contrasted with the statements contained in several
Quebec cases at the turn of this century, which track post-
Napoleonic Code French doctrine on the nature and specificity of
a real right, and which claim that one cannot hypothecate after-
acquired property in Quebec. 17
The first question that sprang to mind was, were these charges
limited to sales of seigniorial land? The short answer is no. With
the assistance of members of the Montreal Business History
Project,18 I expanded my research to cover early 19th century
contracts of loan. The "executory hypothec" clause exists in most
Broux, dans le Seigneurie D&ry, executed before Pierre Lukin, Sr., notary, June 25,
1790.
The clauses varied over the years, and even within a given time period. Although
absent in this instance, acceleration clauses were not uncommon; see, e.g., ANQM CN
601-187 #6259 - contract of loan made by the Bank of Montreal to Abner and Stanley
Bagg, and Oliver Wait (traders), executed before Henry Griffin, notary, February 18,
1826.
16 See also Esplin v. Campbell (1900), 6 R. de J. 81 (Sup. Ct.).
17 See, e.g., Corporation du Village de la Pointe Gatineau v. Hanson, supra, footnote 14.
18 The Montreal Business History Project is an inter-university research group established
in 1976 at McGill University in Montreal. It consists of historians interested in social,
legal and business history. The group's research has centered on early 19th century
Montreal. Current research focuses on the legal history of mid-19th century Montreal,
and in particular issues such as dower, codification, and master/servant relations.
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contracts of loan for diverse enterprises in Quebec, at least,
through to the 1820s.
Another question that occurred was whether the concept of an
executory hypothec was restricted to a certain class or vocational
group within the society, for example, loans between merchants
only, just like the later special statutes applied only to certain
enterprises? Again, the answer is no. The phrases exist in loans
not only where a merchant acts as creditor, but also where the
creditor is listed as an artisan, 19 a builder, 20 and even a yeoman.
21
In short, the lien was available to all categories of creditor,
merchant and yeoman alike.
These clauses were not unique to the early 19th century. Discus-
sions with other members of the Business History group indicated
that these clauses were present from the earliest moments in New
France, and can be traced back at least to the 17th century. They
are not, therefore, some aberration caused by the confluence of
civil and common law concepts following the conquest of 1760.
Rather, as we shall shortly see, these civil law clauses anticipate
the English common law by at least three centuries.
One might ask whether these clauses were "true" security
interests: was the charge exercisable against third parties? I have
no evidence as to how the charges were interpreted in the courts,
although I am currently researching that issue. I do however have
evidence that the clauses were meaningful: in several instances,
competing security interests were created by several creditors in
the same collateral with full knowledge of the other security
interest.
For example, on February 18, 1826, a contract of loan between
the Bank of Montreal (creditor) and Abner and Stanley Bagg, and
Oliver Wait, traders (and debtors) was executed before Henry
Griffin, notary. The instrument contained a clause of the type
outlined above. Attached to this document was another
instrument listed as "An Act of Indemnity", in which it was
19 See, e.g., ANQM CN 601-187 #3925 - contract of loan between Samuel Gerrard
(merchant, creditor) and Louis Graveland and Peter Lamoureux (joiner and painter
respectively, debtors), executed before Henry Griffin, notary, October 2,1821.
20 See, e.g., ANOM CN 601-187 #6016-contract between Samuel Gerrard (President of
the Bank of Montreal, creditor) and J. Redpath (mason, debtor), executed before Henry
Griffin, notary, September 16,1825.
21 See, e.g., ANQM CN 601-187 #4910- contract of loan between John Wilson (yeoman,
creditor) and James Bowes (brewer, debtor), executed before Henry Griffin, notary,
September 27,1823.
[Vol. 15
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acknowledged that Abner Bagg was the principal debtor to the
Bank of Montreal. He had borrowed several sums of money from
the bank, giving in exchange promissory notes which he could not
honour "without a great sacrifice of valuable property". Accord-
ingly, Stanley Bagg and Oliver Wait acted as guarantors (sureties)
for the rescheduled loan from the bank. In return, the guarantors
received a mortgage charge over all Abner Bagg's property,
moveable and immoveable, present and future.22
It seems unlikely that the second creditors would go to the
trouble to create a junior charge unless that charge had some legal
effect as against previous and subsequent charges. As for the issue
of "true" security interest, I note that a charge need not be
exercisable against third parties in order to constitute it a security
device, as is true, as we shall see shortly, with the English floating
charge.23
Although I have no evidence of how these Quebec clauses were
interpreted in the courts, there was a right of preference in the
Custom of Paris similar in substance to the floating charge. Since
the Custom of Paris was the law in force during the period in
question, this most likely was the precedent for the clauses in the
Quebec instruments. Therefore, in order to consider whether
French civil law contained the concept of an executory hypothec,
we shall now examine some of the principal features and charac-
teristics of the common law floating charge .24
The traditional rationale or narrative about the development of
the English common law floating charge is that it was developed in
the 19th century by the British judiciary. During the early stages of
development, there were actually two theories of the floating
22 See ANQM CN 601-187 #6277.
23 In fact, to claim that a charge is not a "true" security device unless it is immediately
exercisable against third parties is to adopt the American position on the English floating
charge; see, e.g., Geilfuss v. Corrigan, 95 Wis. 651, 70 N.W. 306 (S.C., 1897); and
Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 354, 45 S. Ct. 566, 69 LEd. 991 (1925). See also Grant
Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property (Boston, Little, Brown, 1965), Chapters
6,8.
24 Much of what follows is taken from R.M. Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security,
2nd ed. (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1988), pp. 45-91. See also Pennington, supra,
footnote 3; J.S. Ziegel, "Recent and Prospective Developments in the Personal Property
Security Law Area" (1985), 10 C.B. L.J. 131; J.S. Ziegel, "Recent and Prospective
Developments in the Personal Property Security Area and the Recommendations of the
Ontario Advisory Committee" in Special Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada
1985 (Don Mills, De Boo, 1985), p. 1. See also Wegenast, supra, footnote 9, at pp. 659 et
seq.
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charge: first, that it was a fixed charge, with a licence to deal;
second (and this became the dominant theory), that it was a non-
specific or general charge, with postponed attachment. Under the
second theory, during the period of the postponement the debtor
had the power of management over the assets, and the creditor
was bound not to interfere in transactions in the ordinary course of
business. 25 The general rationale given for the creation of the
floating charge in English common law is that it was developed to
facilitate creditors' capacity to take security in stock in trade as
capital intensive industries were growing; in short, to facilitate
inventory financing.
The crucial first stage in the development of the English
common law floating charge is often seen as originating in the
landmark decision of A. P. Holroyd v. J. G. Marshall,26 which
upheld a clause containing a fixed charge on future property.
Within a decade of that decision, in a case before Giffard L.J. in
1870, 27 the common law judiciary developed a notion of a general
charge on present and future property.
The oft-quoted passage of Buckley L.J. in Evans v. Rival
Granite Quarries, Ltd.28 neatly summarizes the essential nature of
a common law floating charge:
A floating security is not a future security; it is a present security, which
presently affects all the assets of the company expressed to be included in it.
On the other hand, it is not a specific security; the holder cannot affirm that
the assets are specifically mortgaged to him. The assets are mortgaged in
such a way that the mortgagor can deal with them without the concurrence of
the mortgagee. A floating security is not a specific mortgage of the assets,
plus a licence to the mortgagor to dispose of them in the course of his
business, but is a floating mortgage applying to every item comprised in the
security, but not specifically affecting any item until some event occurs or
some act on the part of the mortgagee is done which causes it to crystallize
into a fixed security ... This crystallization may be brought about in various
ways. A receiver may be appointed, or the company may go into liquidation
and a liquidator be appointed, or any event may happen which is defined as
bringing to an end the licence to the company to carry on business.
25 See Ziegel, Special Lectures, supra, footnote 24, at pp. 11-12, and Pennington, supra,
footnote 3, particularly at pp. 644-6. For an excellent description of the latter theory see
Governments Stock and Other Securities Investment Co. Ltd. v. Manila Railway Co. Ltd.,
[1897] A.C. 81 (H.L.) at p. 86, per Lord Macnaghten.
26 (1861-62) 11 E.R. 999, 10 H.L.C. 191. See also Pennington, supra, footnote 3, at pp. 634-
7, and Goode, supra, footnote 24, at p. 45.
27 In Re Panama, New Zealand and Australian Royal Mail Co. (1870), 5 Ch. App. 318, 39
L.J. Ch. 482. See Wegenast, supra, footnote 9, at p. 660; Pennington, supra, footnote 3,
at p. 639; and Goode, supra, footnote 24, at p. 47.
28 [191012 K.B. 979 (C.A.) at pp. 999-1000, per Buckley L.J.
[Vol. 15
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The three characteristics of a floating charge identified by
Romer L.J. in Re Yorkshire Woolcombers Association Ltd.29 are:
first, it is a charge on a class of company assets both present and
future; second, the class is one within which the particular assets of
the company are constantly changing in the ordinary course of the
business; and third, while the charge "floats", the debtor is given
the power to manage the assets of the company, free from the
creditor's interference. A floating charge might, therefore, be
described as a present security in a constantly changing fund of
assets. Throughout the course of the charge "floating", the debtor
has the power to manage the assets in the ordinary course of
business.30
Although the security interest under a floating charge has
immediate existence, it does not attach until a later event ("crys-
tallization"). During the pre-crystallization period within which
the interest "floats", assignees of specific assets within the charge
fund take free of the floating charge. 31 Given this vulnerability,
what advantages do creditors gain from a floating charge?
The first and most obvious advantage is that the debtor is able to
manage the assets of the company without interference from the
creditor. As a result, the debtor need not acquire further
permission from the creditor for the sale or assignment of specific
assets within the fund. Such permission would normally be
essential if assets within the fund were subject to a fixed charge.
Second, no new act is required when the crystallizing event occurs.
At that stage the creditor may take possession of the assets
covered by the floating charge and realize on the collateral. A
judicial order for sale is not necessary. Third, once crystallization
occurs the charge becomes fixed on the assets then in existence.
Consequently, assets dealt with after crystallization are subject to
29 [1903] 2 Ch. 284 (C.A.) at p. 295, affd [1904] A.C. 355 (H.L.) at p. 358 sub nom. Ming-
worth v. Houldsworth, per Lord Macnaghten. See also Pennington, supra, footnote 3, at
pp. 645-6; Goode, supra, footnote 24, at pp. 48-9; Wegenast, supra, footnote 9, at pp.
659-60.
30 The Ontario Court of Appeal firmly supports this description in Re Urman (1983), 3
D.L.R. (4th) 631,44 O.R. (2d) 248.
31 See generally Ziegel, supra, footnote 24; Goode, supra, footnote 24, at pp. 50-2;
Wegenast, supra, footnote 9, at pp. 659 et seq. As to the ability to assign specific assets,
Re Borax Co., [1901] 1 Ch. 326, 70 L.J. Ch. 162 (C.A.), held that a firm could sell the
whole of its undertaking if it was within its corporate powers to do so. The basic principle
was established in Re Panama, supra, footnote 27. Other examples are found in
Wegenast, supra, footnote 9, at pp. 662-3; see also Re Urman, supra, footnote 30.
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the charge, unless the creditor has explicitly or implicitly autho-
rized such dealings. 32 Fourth, execution creditors who do not
complete the execution process before crystallization take subject
to the floating charge. 33 Fifth, the creditor can appoint a receiver
to manage the business in the event of default, rather unlike the
case under a fixed charge, where a sale of assets is the sole
remedy.
34
There are, however, several disadvantages with a floating
charge. As noted, assets covered by the floating charge are
vulnerable to third party transactions. Thus a third party assignee
who takes (either conditionally or absolutely) prior to crystalli-
zation and in the ordinary course of business usually takes free of
the floating charge. 35 The chargee's vulnerability exists until the
moment of crystallization, when the floating charge is converted
into a fixed charge. Therefore, the crucial moment with a charge
of this type is the crystallizing event. What events trigger
crystallization?
Essentially, crystallization is triggered by any event that revokes
the debtor's power to manage the business, most commonly the
appointment, out of court, of a receiver. Similarly, revocation
occurs through taking possession, or a judicial order for
possession or sale, 36 cessation of trade (either express or, if the
32 Implicit authorization might arise, for example, in the situation where a creditor's
receiver continues the operation of the business, rather than realizing on the collateral.
From a third party's perspective, the charge has not crystallized in such instances. See
Ziegel, Special Lectures, supra, footnote 24, at p. 14, and idem C.B.L.J., at p. 153; and
Goode, supra, footnote 24, at pp. 60-4. For a more general discussion of the role of a
privately appointed receiver, see Sperry Inc. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce
(1985), 17 D.L.R. (4th) 236, 50 O.R. (2d) 267 (C.A.); and Ziegel, Special Lectures,
ibid., at pp. 25-8.
33 Evans v. Rival Granite Quarries Ltd., supra, footnote 28, at p. 996,per Fletcher Moulton
L.J.; Geisse v. Taylor and Hartland, [1905] 2 K.B. 658. See also Ziegel, Special Lectures,
supra, footnote 24, at p. 16; Goode, supra, footnote 24, at p. 50; Wegenast, supra,
footnote 9, at pp. 663-4.
34 Edwards v. Standard Rolling Stock Syndicate, [1893] 1 Ch. 574; Re Victoria Steamboats
Ltd., [1897] 1 Ch. 158. See also Goode, supra, footnote 24, at p. 50.
35 See Re Urman, supra, footnote 30; Re Huxley Catering Ltd. (1982), 134 D.L.R. (3d) 369,
36 O.R. (2d) 703 sub nom. Irving A. Burton Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce. See also, Wegenast, supra, footnote 9, at pp. 663-4; Goode, supra, footnote
24, at pp. 83-9; and footnote 31 with the accompanying text.
36 Mere default by the debtor is insufficient to crystallizing the charge, as is a demand for
payment. In both instances the debtor's authority to manage the business has not been
effectively revoked by the creditor, particularly when viewed from the perspective of
other creditors; see Evans v. Rival Granite Quarries Ltd., supra, footnote 28, and Re
Hubbard and Co. Ltd. (1898), 68 L.J. Ch. 54. See also Goode, supra, footnote 24, at pp.
67-8; and Wegenast, supra, footnote 9, at pp. 663-4.
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company goes into liquidation, implied) and any events specified
in the debenture (the so-called "automatic crystallization"
events).37 For our purposes, it is the first set of events -
revocation of authority through appointment of a receiver or
taking possession - that are most important.
What are the priorities under the floating charge? In effect,
there is no in rem right while the charge continues to float: the
charge is ineffective against third parties until crystallization. A
buyer or encumbrancer, who acquires an interest in the ordinary
course of business while the charge floats, takes priority over the
charge even if he or she has knowledge of the charge. 38 In general,
the only circumstances under which the floating charge will take
priority to a later pre-crystallization dealing is where bad faith may
be imputed, for example, if the assignee has notice of the restric-
tions of the floating charge or if the dealings are out of the ordinary
course of business. Execution creditors, as we have seen, take free
from the floating charge only if execution is completed before
crystallization.
In summary, therefore, an English common law floating charge
is a present general security which floats over the asset pool of the
debtor. It is converted to a fixed charge on crystallization. Crystal-
lization is in effect the removal of the debtor's power of
management of the assets of the business. The most frequent
event which triggers crystallization is appointment of a receiver.
Third party assignees who take in the ordinary course of business
while the charge floats (that is, prior to crystallization) take free of
the charge. In civilian terms, therefore, while the charge floats
there is no droit de suite. The major benefits of the floating charge
are that, prior to crystallization, the debtor is free to manage the
assets of the business without interference from the creditor; yet
once crystallization occurs no new act is required by the creditor in
order to bring the assets to sale. Once crystallization occurs an in
rem right in the assets arises. At that moment the floating charge
has priority over subsequent charges.
37 Evans v. Rival Granite Quarries Ltd., ibid.; Hodson v. Tea Co. (1880), 14 Ch. D. 859;
Wallace v. Universal Automatic Machines Co., [1894] 2 Ch. 547 (C.A.). See also,
Wegenast, supra, footnote 9, at pp. 663-4. As to events specified in the debenture, see
Governments Stock and other Securities Investment Co. Ltd. v. Manila Ry. Co. Ltd.,
supra, footnote 25; and Re Brightlife Ltd., [1986] 3 All E.R. 673 (Ch. D.). See also
Goode, supra, footnote 24, at pp. 64-74.
38 See Re Castell & Brown Ltd., [1898] 1 Ch. 315; English and Scottish Mercantile
Investment Co. Ltd. v. Brunton, [1892] 2 Q.B. 700 (C.A.). See also Goode, supra,
footnote 24, at p. 85.
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Both F.W. Wegenast and R.R. Pennington view the concept of
a floating charge as unique to the common law, although
Pennington acknowledges that a similar concept existed in Roman
law.39 Implicit in the commentary of both authors is the claim that
no such concept existed in the civil law. Certainly, the floating
charge is unknown to modern civil law.4° Wegenast substantiates
his observation that the floating charge was a common law devel-
opment by citing art. 170 of the Custom of Paris, claiming that
"the Civil Code would recognize no such thing as a chattel
mortgage on chattels remaining in the possession of the
mortgagor.''41
In his interpretation of art. 170 Wegenast, however, wrongly
assumes that the droit de suite is a necessary characteristic of a
right of preference; but, as has been explained, even under a
common law floating charge no right in rem exists prior to crystalli-
zation. He is correct in stating that the civil law does not recognize
a chattel mortgage on chattels remaining in the possession of the
debtor; but it does not follow that therefore the civil law does not
recognize a right of preference in chattels remaining in the
possession of the debtor. The law may very well recognize another
form of security device, such as an executory hypothec, or the
English floating charge, in these instances.
In order to substantiate my claim that the concept of an
executory hypothec existed from at least the 16th century onwards
in the French civil law, I now turn to examine the various articles
under the Custom of Paris and the Custom of Normandy, and shall
compare the characteristics of the right of preference outlined
there with the characteristics of the floating charge.
(a) The Custom of Paris
The Custom of Paris contained a relatively sophisticated
concept of a general security interest, not unlike the modern
39 See Wegenast, supra, footnote 9, at pp. 659 et seq. ; and Pennington, supra, footnote 3, at
p. 634. Pennington notes that Roman Law contained a concept of hypotheca for
moveables, which developed out of the Roman concept of pignus. The latter was
identical to the modern concept of pledge, only the lender was permitted to redeliver the
pledged goods to the borrower, who held them at the lender's pleasure (bailee at will).
The hypotheca merely took the concept of delivery and redelivery one step further by
fictionalizing it.
4 0 Article 2022, C.C.L.C.
41 Article 170 reads: "Meubles n'ont point de suites par hypotheque, quand ils ont hors la
possession du ddbiteur." See Wegenast, supra, footnote 9, at p. 656.
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English floating charge in personal property. The articles dealing
with this concept are located in Title 8 of the Custom of Paris. This
title concerns arrt, execution, et gageries. The words contained in
this heading had various meanings under the Custom of Paris and
often one finds the word saisie substituted for the word arrit. The
verb saisir means to "seize". In the context of the Custom of Paris,
it sometimes meant simply the seizing of moveables of the debtor,
and sometimes the seizing and execution of the moveables. It also
refers to the seizing of proceeds, loosely speaking, accounts
receivables in the hands of a third party when such proceeds were
due to the debtor (i.e., garnishment): indeed, the word arrt
typically referred to this event. 42 The word execution meant the
sale of the moveables seized, although it sometimes meant a
simple seizing of the moveables of the debtor. The term gagerie
was a right or privilege by which the moveables in a house were
charged, even though not seized to the landlord and certain
others.
Article 160 of the Custom of Paris lists three causes for seizing
and selling the moveable property of a debtor. The first, and most
relevant one for our purposes, stated that one can seize and sell
the moveable property of a debtor as a result of an obligation or
contract executed before a notary. If the contract is formally
signed and sealed in the jurisdiction where it is passed, the goods
can be sold without the authority and permission of a judge;
conceptually, the seal of a notary had the same effect as a royal
seal, in that it had the same force as a sentence or judgment. The
obligation contained in a contract of this sort against the
moveables and immoveables of the debtor was described as
"executory" (executoire).43 Unlike the modern concept of
hypothec, this is functionally equivalent to the remedies available
under modem PPSA regimes.
44
42 Il se prend encore pour la saisie des deniers entre les mains d'un tiers, appartenans ou dus
au ddbiteur de celui quifait la saisie, et la saisie en ce cas est appellee arrdt, parce qu'elle ne
fait qu'arrdter ce qui est d2 au ddbiteurjusqu'd ce que le saisissant ait obtenu par sentence
que les deniers saisis lui soient mis entre les mains pour & en deduction de ce que son
debiteur lui doit, en sorte qu'en ce cas saisie et arrdt sont synonymes.
43 Article 164, Custom of Paris. This is conceptually similar to the notion that the common
law floating charge has not attached until crystallization - that is to say, the charge
remains executory until the crystallizing event, at which point it becomes executed.
The commentary accompanying the version of the Custom of Paris used by me (C.
Ferriere, revised and edited by S. D'Aramon (Paris, Chez les Libraires Associds, 1770))
cites Arrets of October 1550, and December 1, 1552, in support of this proposition. These
dates indicate a much earlier usage of this type of security interest than had hitherto been
suspected.
44 The modem hypothec in Quebec requires bringing the charge to judgment unless the
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In the absence of a notarized deed, a creditor could seize the
moveable property of his or her debtor in much the same way as a
modern execution creditor, by requesting and receiving a schedule
(simple cidule) from a judge, pursuant to art. 173 of the Custom of
Paris.45
Under art. 177 of the Custom of Paris, the first creditor to seize
or to bring the moveable to judicial sale was preferred over other
creditors. The rationale listed in the commentary for this
preference is that such a rule rewards the diligence of the creditor
who watches or ensures that his interests are recompensed, to the
detriment of the other creditors who have neglected their affairs.
However, the charge was not effective in an insolvency. The
Custom of Paris draws a distinction between what it calls simple
ex&ution and diconfiture (insolvency). In cases of insolvency,
according to art. 179, no creditors are preferred. 6 Rather, they all
share rateably, for the reason that no creditors in these situations
should find themselves in a better circumstance than the others. In
other words, presumably they were all equally negligent in
attending to their affairs.
We may therefore conclude that there are at least two similar-
ities between the preferential right under the Custom of Paris and
the English floating charge. First, provided the hypothec was
signed and sealed before a notary, no new action was necessary for
a creditor to bring the moveable property (present and future) of a
debtor to sale. This is similar to the situation under a floating
charge. Second, the preferred creditor in a competitive situation
was the first to seize. Arguably, this is similar to the situation with
a floating charge, where the preferred creditor is the one who first
causes crystallization, the most frequent form being possession by
the receiver. That is, the preferred creditor is often the first seizor.
(b) The Custom of Normandy
The Custom of Paris was the legal regime in force in Quebec
debtor voluntarily surrenders the property to the creditor (di laissement); see generally,
L. Sarna and A. Neudorfer, The Law of Hypothecs in Quebec (Montreal, Jewel Publica-
tions, 1987).
45 The second cause for which a creditor could seize a debtor's moveable property was a
sentence of imprisonment or death. The third cause was a special privilege, such as was
contained in arts. 86, 161, 163, 171, 173, and 175, which gave the counterparts to a
modern privilege in civil law, or a judicial or statutory lien in common law.
46 See also, art. 180 of the Custom of Paris. Simple exdcution appears to be the ancient
equivalent to saisie-exicution mobiliere.
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prior to 1866, and it is most likely that the clauses contained in the
Quebec instruments created the type of charge described in art.
160 et seq. However, this type of executory hypothec was available
in other regions of 17th century France. Indeed, it is equally hard
to distinguish between the charge found under the Custom of
Normandy and the modem English floating charge.
Like the Custom of Paris, the Custom of Normandy did not
allow a right to follow moveables alienated by the debtor in the
ordinary course of business. However, pursuant to art. 593 of the
Custom of Normandy, when the moveables were in the hands of
the debtor the order of hypothecs was preserved and the first to
seize had only the expenses of his actions, before the preceding
secured creditors. Henry Basnage, the author of a 17th century
treatise on the law of hypothecs, argued that the latter right under
the Custom of Normandy was preferable to the right created by
the Custom of Paris. He reasoned that since moveables are suscep-
tible of hypothecation, one must preserve the effect of hypothe-
cation to the fullest extent and should prefer senior creditors over
the first to seize.
47
In contrast to the Custom of Paris, the Custom of Normandy
made no distinction between simple execution and ddconfiture.
Merchandise and accounts receivable could be seized when the
debtor was insolvent or when they were sold by the debtor in
contemplation of insolvency. In either case, all assets fell into the
mass or were to be returned to the mass, so that the hypothecated
creditors could take in the order their respective charges were
created .48 From the moment the debtor sensed that insolvency was
imminent, a presumption of preferential sale arose and the debtor
could not dispose of his or her effects in favour of some of the
creditors, to the prejudice of others.49 There were two exceptions
to these prejudicial sales. First, a creditor who took goods in
payment in good faith before seizure could not be followed by
senior creditors. Second, a good faith creditor who was paid by the
debtor immediately prior to bankruptcy was not liable to the other
creditors.50
47 Henry Basnage, sieur de Franquenay, Trait des Hypothdques: Divisi en Deux Parties
(Paris, Chez J. Les Febvre, 1694), p. 74.
48 Ibid., at p. 75.49 Ibid., at p. 76.
50 Ibid. ,at pp. 75-6. Arguably, this is the same as English common law during this period;
see Ryall v. Rolle (1749), 1 Atk. 165, 26 E.R. 107. If my reading of Ryall is correct, then
Twyne's Case (1601), 3 Co. Rep. 80b, 76 E.R. 809, has been misread by modem scholars.
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The Custom of Normandy, like the Custom of Paris, did not
allow the creditor to follow hypothecated moveables sold in the
ordinary course of business by the debtor: there was no droit de
suite in this respect in French law. According to Basnage, the
reasons for this were three-fold. First, moveables do not have a
"perpetual and certain substance" like immoveables; therefore,
their very nature prevents their being hypothecated by virtue of a
simple contract. Second, a creditor who did not take possession of
the moveable implied to third parties that he or she had not
accepted an undertaking with regard to the assets. Third, a right to
follow would render commerce inconvenient.5 1
It is interesting to note that the first rationale is the traditional
reason given by jurists for the incapacity to hypothecate
moveables under the modern civil law; it reinforces the perceived
necessity of the conceptual division between moveable and
immoveable property in the civil law. However, unlike modern
jurists, Basnage does not make the error of conflating the concepts
of droit de suite and "right of preference".
Thus, neither Custom created a droit de suite, and yet each
Custom contained a non-possessory executory hypothec for
moveables. Basnage viewed the Roman law rule that gave a right
to follow in cases of hypothecation as too severe or harsh. He
stated that, given the frequency at which property changed hands,
a rule of this sort prevented the debtor from disposing of anything
of significant value. Therefore the Custom of Normandy, as with
most of the Customs of France, did not retain the right given under
Roman law to follow hypothecated moveables into the hands of a
third party. This rationale is remarkably similar to the justification
given for the non-attachment of a floating charge prior to crystalli-
zation: namely, third parties are entitled to assume that the debtor
has the creditors' permission to deal with the assets in the ordinary
course of business.
As regards competition amongst competing creditors, the
Custom of Normandy retained the right given under Roman law
for the senior creditors to rank ahead of a junior creditor, even
when the latter was the first to seize. 52 This consequence is similar
to the outcome amongst creditors with competing floating
charges.
51 Ibid., at pp. 83-4.
52 Ibid., at p. 76. The Custom of Normandy was similar in this regard to the Custom of
Anjou, art. 421, and the Custom of Main, art. 436.
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What comparisons can then be drawn between the executory
hypothec of the Custom of Normandy and the English floating
charge? First, like the modern floating charge, the Custom of
Normandy did not distinguish between simple exicution and
diconfiture in terms of the application of its right of preference.
Second, under the Custom of Normandy, no further act was
required to bring the moveables of the debtor to judicial sale, so
long as the hypothec was signed and sealed before a notary. Third,
prior to a creditor seizing the property of the debtor, the charge
floated over the assets, both present and future, and gave the
debtor authority to manage his or her affairs in the ordinary course
of business. Fourth, the "crystallizing event", the event which
converted the charge from an executory to an executed interest,
was any action taken by a creditor to seize the assets of the debtor.
Fifth, unlike the Custom of Paris but like the modern English
floating charge, hypothecated creditors ranked in order of the date
of hypothecation. Sixth, transactions out of the ordinary course of
business and prior to bankruptcy were void.
(c) Conclusion
It can therefore be plausibly asserted that a right of preference
similar in substance to a modern floating charge existed under the
Custom of Paris and the Custom of Normandy. If this claim is
accurate, then it is most likely that the clauses inserted in the
Quebec instruments were of French and not English origin. It is
equally likely that the Quebec charges were treated according to
the rules contained in arts. 160 and following of the Custom of
Paris. Although not conclusive, the evidence on a balance of
probabilities suggests that the executory hypothec was a well-
known, indeed commonly used, concept in Quebec from the
earliest moments of the French regime to at least the late 1820s. It
may have been used beyond that time. It covered all assets,
moveable and immoveable, present and future, long before the
English judiciary "created" the modem floating charge.
4. Some Speculations About the Mysterious Disappearance of
Quebec's Floating Charge
If the executory hypothec was so common in the 1820s, why
does it not appear in the Civil Code of Lower Canada? At what
moment between 1830 and 1866 did it cease to be used, and why? I
12-15 C.B.L.J.
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have no answers to these questions, but I can offer some specula-
tions.
It seems unlikely that the codifiers were unaware of such a
clause. Although the deeds were drafted by notaries (the codifiers
were advocates), the codifiers all apprenticed in the 1820s, and in
all likelihood were aware of the presence of these clauses.
Certainly one of the three codifiers, C.D. Day, was aware of them.
Day defended a case on another issue arising from a deed which
included these clauses. In that case, he made no objection to the
deed on the ground that the executory hypothec was irregular.
53
It is noteworthy that, as of 1841, all Quebec statutes dealing
with hypothecs refer only to immoveables. One should not assume
that hypothecs on moveables were thenceforth eliminated in daily
practice, but it does suggest that the concept of hypothec was
becoming unique to immoveables by that date. Following an 1841
Ordinance, all hypothecs had to be specific rather than general. 5
4
There is a puzzling comment in the codifier's reports of 1866 that,
with the introduction of this requirement of specificity, the
German rather than French system of hypothecs was introduced
into the province. 55 Nevertheless, one cannot argue that the
Ordinance of 1841 eliminated executory hypothecs over
moveables merely because it did not mention hypothecs on
moveables, although it may well be that the Ordinance had
precisely that effect, by negative implication.
One might argue that the development of other forms of
security device such as fictitious bills of lading and warehouse
receipts made the executory hypothec less popular and less
effective. But that argument seems somewhat implausible since,
from a creditor's viewpoint, what could be more practical than an
executory hypothec, especially in the Quebec of the 1850s-60s. To
53 Hamilton v. Lamoureux (February 2, 1842, King's Bench, District of Montreal), per
Pyke, Rolland and Gale JJ.
54 An Ordinance to prescribe and regulate the Registering of Titles to Lands, Tenements
and Hereditaments, Real or Immoveable Estates, and of Charges and Incumbrances on
the same; and for the alteration and improvement of the law, in certain particulars in
relation to the Alienation and Hypothecation of Real Estates, and the Rights and
Interest acquired therein, S.L.C. 1841, c. 30. It was decided in Corporation du Village de
la Pointe Gatineau v. Hanson (1901), 10 B.R. 346, that one effect of this Ordinance was
to eliminate hypothecs of future property.
55 Quebec, Legislative Assembly, Civil Code of Lower Canada, Sixth and Seventh Reports
and Supplementary Report, (Quebec, George E. Desbarats, 1865), Title Seventeenth,
Commentary accompanying Chapter 3, "Of Hypothecs", at pp. 54-6.
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argue that the executory hypothec disappeared because it was
more practical not to have one seems to stretch the point
somewhat, especially when the traditional common law narrative
proclaims "practicality" as the motivating force behind the devel-
opment of the floating charge.
What plausible explanation, then, is there for the disappearance
of the executory hypothec from commercial practice in Quebec?
I suspect the answer is connected to the infant years of the major
player on the financial scene during this period: the chartered
bank. Its appearance on the Quebec financial scene neatly
coincides with the disappearance of these charges. What might
have motivated the bank's directorate to abolish such charges?
One could posit a conspiratorial hypothesis. After all, with the
advent of fictitious bills of lading and warehouse receipts in the
1840s, and given that the banks had a near-monopoly on pledges
of documents of title, these institutions stood to gain the most
from outlawing hypothecs on moveables. Accorditigly, the bank
directors, themselves members of the Legislative Assembly, may
have lobbied for legislation that would indirectly prohibit
hypothecs on moveables. This would have left them with a near-
monopoly on moveable collateral security. Most of the members
of the Special Council following the Rebellions, including that of
the year 1841, were either directors or shareholders in the banks,
and thus were well placed to implement law reform which
favoured their own interests.56 Yet if that were the situation, why
did they not do it expressly, rather than through negative
implication?
A more likely (and more innocent) explanation for the banks'
involvement in abolishing the executory hypothec lies in the
banks' charter and the economic crisis of 1825. Before the
chartered banks came on the scene, many wealthy Quebecers
acted as private merchant bankers. However, the majority of
those capable of acting in this capacity became directors of one of
the three banks in the 1820s. Under the charter of the banks,
directors were prohibited from acting as private bankers.57 When
56 Including for example, Samuel Gerrard, director of the Bank of Montreal and its
president from 1820 to 1826. He was a Special Council member from April 2 to June 1,
1838 and from November 2, 1838 to February 10, 1841 (F.G. Halpenny, ed., Dictionary
of Canadian Biography, Vol. 8, s.v. (Toronto, U.T. Press, 1985)). See, infra, text accom-
panying footnotes 60 to 62.
57 The bank's royal charter was granted in An Act for incorporating certain Persons therein
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forced to assign their loans to the banks in order to assume the
directorate, the directors may have merely assigned their interest
as mortgagees in the form that they first charged the debtor's
assets, namely, an executory hypothec. But the banks themselves
were empowered to receive hypothecs on immoveables only as
"additional security" (that is, banks could not finance the
purchase of real property), and then as a fixed charge only after
1841.58 By 1821, the only security devices in moveables available
to banks was the pledge, either of chattels or securities. 59 Thus,
hypothecs on moveables taken by the banks in the infant years, as
assignees, would not be renewable upon maturity of the loan.
Therefore, the following hypothesis seems most plausible. Most
of the private merchant bankers in Quebec became public bankers
with the advent of chartered banking. The chartered banks were
restricted in the type of collateral they could take for loans - a
fixed charge on existing immoveables and/or a pledge of chattels,
securities, or fictitious documents of title. These restraints,
imposed on the chartered banks between 1821 and 1841, most
likely caused the demise of Quebec's executory hypothec.
Although these restraints existed in the banks' charters from
1821 onwards, little attention was paid to them in the early years of
chartered banking. So, for example, the standard form contract of
loan used by the Bank of Montreal until 1825 still contained an
executory hypothec clause. It does not appear in the bank's
contracts after that date. Why did the directorate of the bank
conform to the requirements of the charter after that date, and not
before? In the absence of any direct evidence of what caused the
directors to act so conservatively, I suggest that it may have been
connected with the economic crisis of 1826, and the Samuel
named under the name of "President, Directors and Company of the Bank of Montreal"
S.L.C. 1821, c. 25, which is discussed in Chapter 7 of Merrill Denison, Canada's First
Bank, A History of the Bank of Montreal, Vol. 1 (Toronto, McClelland and Stewart,
1966). The provisions of the Act "were not materially different from those of the Articles
of Association" (p. 140) of which the 15th article is the relevant one (p. 411). This corre-
sponds to s. 5 in the Act, which reads in part:
5.... Provided always that the said Directors shall not, during the period of their
services as Directors of the said Bank, act as private Bankers.
See also, An Act for the incorporation of certain persons therein-mentioned, under the
name of the "Quebec Bank", S.L.C. 1821, c. 26, s. 3.
58 See supra, footnotes 54 and 57. See too s. 8 of Quebec Bank charter, supra, footnote 57.
59 Given these restrictions with regard to moveable collateral, one can understand why the
directorate of the banks were keen to develop pledges of fictitious documents of title.
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Gerrard affair, when the Bank of Montreal came perilously close
to folding. 6°
Gerrard was born in Ireland to a prosperous Anglo-Irish family
in 1767. He moved to Montreal and was established as a merchant
in the fur trade as early as 1785. In 1791, he became a partner in
the fur trading firm Grant, Campion & Company, which dissolved
in 1795. In 1792 he consolidated his wealth by marrying the sister
of his partner William Grant, a powerful Quebec merchant.
In November 1795, he formed Parker, Gerrard & Ogilvy, a fur
trading firm that competed against the North West Company and
expanded its trading in staples such as wheat, flour, timber, and
possibly potash. The firm acted as suppliers to the XY Company,
which was aborted by the New North West Company in 1804. By
1814, Gerrard's firm held an interest in New North West worth
£38,500. His firm dissolved in 1814 and he formed Gerrard,
Yeoward, Gillespie & Company. In 1817, he formed a partnership
which held three more firms as subsidiaries. These firms exported
wheat and timber and imported general merchandise. In
December 1821, he sold his share in the firms for £40,000 and
shifted his attention to finance.
Gerrard had long been involved in merchant banking -
granting credit, extending loans of currency, and discounting bills.
In June 1810, he was a prospective stockholder of the Canada
Banking Co., an enterprise which was aborted due to legislative
passivity. Although he did not sign the articles of association, he
was involved with the Bank of Montreal from its beginnings and
served as the president from 1820 to 1826.
In August 1826, the bank's directors found Gerrard guilty of
granting discounts on his personal responsibility. He also granted
loans beyond the permissible £10,000 limit to two prominent
mercantile houses, owned by Gerrard's close friends. He was
accused of favouritism, especially in the case of potential losses
faced through the failure of McTavish, McGillivrays & Company,
and McGillivrays, Thom and Co. These two firms were granted
loans of £28,500 in late 1825 during a severe economic crisis in
Quebec, despite their difficulties in winding up after the 1821
merger between the North West Company and the Hudson's Bay
Company.
60 The Samuel Gerrard affair is discussed thoroughly in Chapter 9 of Denison, supra,
footnote 57, and also in the Dictionary of Canadian Biography, supra, footnote 56.
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Evidence suggests that once Gerrard became president of the
Bank of Montreal he began assigning to the bank many of the
high-risk loans he had granted as a private merchant banker in the
preceding years. Some of Gerrard's larger loans were assigned
immediately before as well as during the economic crisis.
61
Although no study of the impact of Gerrard's behaviour on the
pattern of lending by the Bank of Montreal has apparently been
done, it seems reasonable to assume that it influenced the bank's
directorate, from August 1826 onwards, to adopt a more conser-
vative policy, in strict conformity with the banks' charter.
62
It is thus entirely possible that the Gerrard affair and the
economic crisis of 1825 forced the major creditor within Quebec
society, the Bank of Montreal, to accept from debtors only the
type of collateral permitted by its charter. Permissible collateral
was limited to pledges of chattels, securities, and documents of
title. These events would have been sufficient to cause executory
hypothec clauses to disappear from use within Quebec's legal
community.
The peculiarity of the story outlined above is that it runs counter
to the traditional civilian categories of law and to traditional
visions of the development of the law. In terms of categories of law
and hypothecation, the division between immoveable and
moveable is seen by civilian jurists as fundamental. 'iet this
division is relatively new, predating Quebec's Civil Code by a few
decades at most.
With regard to the development of the law, floating charges and
hypothecation of moveables have been traditionally seen as
61 See, for example, ANOM CN 601-187 #3804, assignment of loan between Samuel
Gerrard (creditor) and Austin Cuvillier (merchant, debtor), to the Bank of Montreal;
executed before Henry Griffin, notary, May 16, 1825. The agreement covering the
original loan, which was for £10,078, was executed before Henry Griffin on July 19, 1821.
As president, Gerrard extended high-risk loans on behalf of the Bank of Montreal to
friends during the crisis. According to the bank's charter the directors' liability was
limited to losses in excess of triple the paid-up capital of the bank (over and above the
reserve.) These loans to friends exceeded the limit, placing the directors of the bank in a
position of potential liability; see, for example, ANQM CN 601-187 #5873, contract of
loan between the Bank of Montreal (creditor) and Maitland, Garden and Auldjo
(merchants, debtors) for £15,700, executed before Henry Griffin, notary, on July 9,
1825.
62 Gerrard continued as a director after 1826. He was also a major shareholder in the
Montreal Savings Bank and the Bank of Canada, both of which were absorbed by the
Bank of Montreal. In 1831 he began supervising Canadian affairs for an English
insurance company. In addition to holding many civic positions in Montreal, he was a
Special Council member from 1838 to 1841. He died in Montreal, March 24, 1857.
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necessary elements in the expansion of industrial capital: hence
the struggle to develop the concept on the part of the British
judiciary and the Quebec legislators, respectively, at the end of
the 19th century. Yet, paradoxically, a concept which existed prior
to codification disappeared at precisely the time when one would
most expect it to be welcomed. This raises questions about the
manner in which we construct our traditional narratives of
doctrinal development, using less than a handful of cases and
statutes as our primary sources in an attempt to understand the
factors at work in one of the richest periods in economic history. In
turn, we must ask ourselves some very basic questions about the
perceived necessity of linking economic growth to particular
doctrinal developments in the law. It is entirely possible that
economic development has occurred and will continue to occur
independent of a given strand of legal doctrine.
At a more modest level the foregoing suggests that, despite art.
2022, Quebec jurists need not fear the introduction of executory
hypothecs in the Civil Code of Quebec. Rather than being
innovative, the reform signals a return to a well-established
Quebec tradition.
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